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Introduction
The corporate law paradigm that shareholders are the owners of a
corporation who elect directors to manage the corporation on the
shareholders' behalf is an old-fashioned legal fiction. Nevertheless,
it has a powerful hold on the legal imagination, as various formula-
tions in the American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance (Principles) demonstrate.' The Principles updated this
paradigm to provide for a monitoring role for directors, who are not
expected to manage the large public corporation, but rather to ap-
point officers to do so. Further, the Principles proposed the model of
independent directors as a mechanism to make the corporation ac-
countable to shareholders. 2
Although the ALI Corporate Governance Project (Project) pro-
ceeded on the premise that something was wrong with the manner
in which American corporate boards functioned, the reporters as-
sumed the perspective of the equity holder seeking stock market
gain. Such a holder may have a different perspective than that of the
* Professor and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of International Business
Law, Brooklyn Law School; Partner, Kelley Drye & Warren; Director, IMCERA Group,
Inc.; Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1977-80; Adviser to ALI's
Corporate Governance Project. The assistance of Brooklyn Law School student Nina
Kim is gratefully acknowledged.
I. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter Proposed
Final Draft].
2. The author previously analyzed and commented upon this model in Roberta S.
Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
534, 544-56 (1984) (reviewing the history of independent director proposals and critiqu-
ing the ALI's tentative provisions and the underlying monitoring model).
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owner of a business enterprise, especially when the holder is an in-
stitutional investor that is a financial intermediary. 3 Many observers
of the takeover frenzy and stock market gyrations of the 1980s de-
cided that shareholders and financial intermediaries were the
trouble with American business.
4
As the convoluted controversies of the Project proceeded through
the 1980s, state legislatures began to take a different perspective
than that of shareholders seeking to cash out their shares at a pre-
mium in overheated stock markets. Starting with Pennsylvania in
1986, more than half of the states passed stakeholder statutes, which
propose a corporate governance model rather different from either
the classic corporate law paradigm of the director-manager acting
for the shareholder-owner or the updated ALI version set forth in
the Principles.5 Although some comments in the Principles make pass-
ing reference to stakeholder statutes, 6 the black-letter law was not
adjusted to address the stakeholder model of corporate governance,
because the ALI Reporters shared the general disapproval of stake-
holder statutes held by the legal establishment, which tended to dis-
miss them as mere antitakeover devices.
This Article argues that the stakeholder statutes were a funda-
mental reaction to the institutionalization of the markets and that
they have realigned not only directorial duties but shareholder
rights. Such rights have been limited by the claims of other corpo-
rate constituencies, specifically debtholders, employees, and com-
munities. In this connection, it should be noted that pension funds,
which are the largest and most influential of the institutional inves-
tors, hold debt as well as equity, represent employees, and often are
political players. Accordingly, the popularly held view that the in-
terests of institutional investors are synonymous with shareholder
interests is basically flawed.
Under the stakeholder model, directors do not owe duties exclu-
sively to stockholders. Rather, they play the role of mediators be-
tween different corporate constituencies. Many lawyers and law
professors feel that this model is unsatisfactory, because it seems to
get directors off the hook7 by eliminating their accountability to a
dearly defined group who can sue them if they are negligent or en-
gage in self-dealing. The model of directors as mediators between
3. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Harry Zirlin, The Institutional Investor and Corporate Owner-
ship, 19 SEc. REG. LJ. 341, 342-43, 351 (1992) (exploring the distinction between "own-
ing securities" and "owning companies").
4. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corpo-
rate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580-81 (1992) (outlining this pervasive
criticism, but concluding that it is "flawed").
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groups with competing claims on corporate assets and prospects is,
however, more realistic and closer to most corporate cultures than a
model in which shareholders are the exclusive beneficiaries of busi-
ness success. In addition, the stakeholder model may provide a
helpful framework for a renewed focus on jobs and competitiveness
in a global marketplace where long-term strategic planning has a
higher value than stock market prices.
Part I of this Article discusses the impact of institutional investors
on corporate governance, their perceived role in the stock market
crises of the 1980s, and more recent proposals by shareholder activ-
ists. Part II analyzes the stakeholder statutes and related court deci-
sions. Part III discusses the way non-shareholder interests are
treated in the Principles. Part IV suggests new roles for directors and
new restraints on institutional investors created by the stakeholder
statutes.
I. Institutions and Corporate Governance
Institutional investors now own more than 50% of all publicly
traded U.S. stocks." Nevertheless, they are not owners of corpora-
tions in the same way that the shareholders of classic capitalism
were envisioned. Rather, institutional shareholders are themselves
intermediaries. 9 They include banks acting as trustees, insurance
companies, mutual funds, and public and private pension funds. In-
stitutions are not monolithic, but their assets are concentrated. In
1990, pension funds accounted for 38.2% of institutional assets,
and the top 20 pension funds accounted for 42.8% of the assets of
the top 200 pension funds. 10
Institutional investors do not behave like individual investors.
They trade with greater frequency than individual shareholders-in
part because of the tax advantages they enjoy in comparison to indi-
vidual investorsl-and thereby contribute to stock market volatil-
ity.1 2 In addition, under modern portfolio theory, institutions are
8. See Michael Siconolfi, Individual Investors' Holdings of U.S. Stocks Fall Below 50a of
Total Market for the First Time, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1992, at C1.
9. See Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Manage-
ment Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981) (identifying and analyzing a "long-term pat-
tern of changes in the institutional arrangements for aggregating and channeling
capital" that has led to a "golden period" for financial intermediaries); see also A Survey of
Capitalism, ECONOMIST, May 5, 1990, at 5, 8 (discussing the growth in institutional
investment).
10. WILLIAM M. O'BARR &JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND
POWER OF INSTrruTONAL INVESTING 28-29 (1992) (charting the distribution of assets of
the top 20 pension funds); see also James A. White, Giant Pension Funds' Explosive Growth
Concentrates Economic Assets and Power, WALL ST.J., June 28, 1990, at C1 (noting that while
pension funds generally have experienced rapid growth, "the biggest of the big funds
have expanded even more significantly").
11. "Black Monday," The Stock Market Crash of October 19, 1987: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 406 (1988)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of John J. Phelan, Jr., submitting report by Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach).
12. Ferrara & Zirlin, supra note 3, at 355; see Division of Market Regulation, SEC,
THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 3-2 (1988).
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encouraged to engage in diversification and index strategies.'3 Nev-
ertheless, their holdings tend to be concentrated in major U.S. pub-
lic corporations rather than smaller companies or foreign issuers.
14
Institutions are generally risk averse, seeking to avoid blame for in-
vestment losses.' 5
Institutions are highly regulated under statutory schemes
designed to protect the beneficiaries who have entrusted them with
the management of their retirement savings.' 6 These statutory
schemes, however, do not impose on institutional investors respon-
sibilities to the corporations in which they invest, because corporate
law is stuck in the paradigms of classical capitalism in which share-
holder-owners owed no duties to either their corporations or other
shareholders, unless perhaps they were controlling shareholders.
17
Institutions with only a small percentage of a corporation's capitali-
zation, however, can exert the same leverage as a controlling share-
holder, especially if several like-minded institutions act in concert or
even in tandem.'
8
Commentators have criticized the passivity of institutional inves-
tors and sometimes have argued that the restrictive proxy rules of
the SEC have inhibited institutions from taking a more active role in
corporate governance. 19 Accordingly, some commentators argue
that the SEC's recently adopted proxy rules, which now permit insti-
tutional investors to confer in order to speak to management with a
common voice, will lead to beneficial institutional activism.
20
13. Hearings, supra note 11, at 414-19 (testimony ofJohn J. Phelan, Jr., submitting
report by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach).
14. See White, supra note 10, at Cl. The investment practices of institutions are to
some extent a function of the sheer size of their portfolios. Indexing also discourages
seeking out small businesses in which to invest.
15. See O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 10, at 85-89.
16. Id at 95-100. These restraints include the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 111990), the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80b-2 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), state regulation
of insurance companies, and banking regulation. For a description of the fiduciary re-
sponsibility provisions of ERISA, see RUSSELL K. OSGOOD, THE LAW OF PENSIONS AND
PROFIT-SHARING 347-71 (1984). See also I TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS 21-88 (1978) (surveying the regulation of different types of investment
managers).
17. See Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973) (noting that a
"dominant or majority stockholder does not become a fiduciary for other stockholders
merely by owning stock"); McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969) (find-
ing no fiduciary duty generally except by a "managing majority").
18. See EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 63 (1981);
O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 10, at 35.
19. E.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520
(1990); RonaldJ. Gilson et al., How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement: Reg-
ulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17J. CORP. L. 29 (1991); MarkJ. Roe, A
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991).
20. See Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform, 17 J.
CORP. L. 49 (1991) (concluding that "institutional oversight might help to correct" many
"shortfalls in American corporate performance"); Nell Minnow, Proxy Reform: The Case
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Others, however, have argued that the new rules likely will lead to
an unhealthy control over corporate governance by a few influential
institutions to the detriment of small shareholders and other corpo-
rate constituencies. 2'
It would appear, however, that institutional passivity is unlikely to
be overcome easily and that the institutions most interested in
shareholder activism are public pension funds with political agen-
das. 22 Moreover, shareholder activists are more likely to destabilize
corporate capitalizations than to compel corporations to engage in
long-term capital planning that will assure financial stability. 23 In
part, the fallacy of relying on institutions to behave like owners in
monitoring corporate managers is that they have delegated their in-
vestment decisionmaking to money managers, whose interests
frequently diverge from those of the institutions and their
beneficiaries.
24
Corporate managers and the public are deeply suspicious of insti-
tutions for at least three reasons. First, institutions were major play-
ers in the takeover battles of the 1980s. 25 In these battles, the
notion of equity investment as a participation in the long-term busi-
ness success of the corporation was devalued, if not lost.26 An envi-
ronment of confrontation and distrust between shareholders and
corporate managers developed in which investors and their champi-
ons focused on disciplining managers instead of making them more
effective.
2 7
for Increased Shareholder Communication, 17 J. CORP. L. 149 (1991) (advocating greater
shareholder involvement in oversight).
2 1. See Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the
Current Push for Proxy Rule Changes, 17J. CORP. L. 163, 173-74, 176-77 (1991) (noting
"the potential for conflicts between the interests of fund managers and the interests of
the beneficial owners of the shares"); Norman Feit, SEC Proxy Reforms: Boon for Free Ex-
pression or Back Room Deals, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 13, 1992, at 11 (stating that opponents "fear
that shareholder voting blocs will form as a result of 'back-room' dealmaking and that
institutional leverage, already substantial but often fragmented, will become all but
monolithic").
22. See Helen Garten, Institutional Investors and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L.
REV. 585, 636-40 (1992) ("The most visible institutional investors today are the huge
public pension funds. Their visibility subjects them to significant political pressures ...
that ... may ultimately make institutions very cautious in proposing solutions to firm-
specific problems that may prove controversial."); Rosenbaum, supra note 21, at 176-79
(noting that political leaders acting as pension fund trustees may "be inclined to use
their enormous voting power to further what they perceive to be popular political
agendas").
23. Garten, supra note 22, at 662-72; Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Signif-
icance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 479-81 (1991).
24. Rock, supra note 23, at 469-78; see also ERNEST BLOCH, INSIDE INVESTMENT BANK-
ING 352-56 (1989) (noting that "the management of wealth has undergone a split be-
tween ownership and management," and that "[diecisions regarding institutional
portfolios are made by managers of wealth with minimal participation by the owners of
wealth").
25. See Garten, supra note 22, at 632-36; Rock, supra note 23, at 447-53.
26. See Steven A. Rosenblum, Proxy Reform, Takeovers, and Corporate Control. The Need
for a New Orientation, 17J. CORP. L. 185, 202 (1991) (explaining that the takeover activity
of the 1980s was unhealthy because long-term success was sacrificed for short-term
profits).
27. Id. at 207-11. There has also been at least a perception that this environment
[VOL. 61:11561160
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Second, institutions were fingered as the culprits in the stock mar-
ket crash of October, 1987.28 Institutional trading strategies cre-
ated conditions of extreme volatility and instability. 29 Although
speculative bubbles and their collapse have always plagued stock
market activity, the speed and severity of the October 19, 1987 mar-
ket break seemed to signify that institutional investors are a new
threat to the stability of capital markets.
Third, institutional investors are powerful, monied interests,
modem counterparts of the Vanderbilts, Morgans, and Rockefellers
who provided capital to industry in past times.3 0 Capital cartels
were rampant in the 1920s, but they were outlawed by the federal
securities laws in the 1930s. Although there are significant differ-
ences between the financial powers of the past and the institutional
investors of today, there also are similarities, and Americans have
never been wholly comfortable with the potential political power of
those who control huge aggregations of capital.
Thus far, institutional investors have led a charmed life in the aca-
demic literature. The law and economics gurus of the past decade
laud shareholders as engines of economic efficiency, destined to dis-
cipline inept managers through tender offers and other free-market
mechanisms.3 1  Others view institutional investors as potential
agents for the greening of corporate America, because they can act
as surrogates for labor and the public interest.32 As the Reagan-
Bush era was drawing to a close, the Chairman of the SEC became
an upscale populist, championing the cause of institutional activists
in the name of corporate accountability. 33
The only real counterpoint to the view that institutional investors
should be encouraged to act like owners and monitor corporate
caused massive job loss. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constitu-
ency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 1002-04 (1992).
28. See Louis LOWENSTmIN, WHAT'S WRONG wrr WALL STREET 56-87 (1988); Lewis
D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 226-28, 241-46 (1988).
29. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 28, at 226-28, 241-46.
30. See O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 10, at 11.
3 1. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1028 (1982); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-
Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161
(1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Takeovers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
32. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Compara-
tive Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1991); Alfred F. Conard, BeyondManagerialism: Inves-
tor Capitalism? 22 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 117, 135-40, 172-74 (1988).
33. The President of Institutional Shareholder Services, in November 1992, praised
SEC Chairman Richard Breeden for his "singleminded determination" as the "principal
advocate for proxy reform." James E. Heard, How New SEC Rules Impact '93 Proxy Season,
ISSUE ALERT, Nov. 1992, at 1.
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managers has been the view, embedded in the Principles, that in-
dependent directors are the key to corporate accountability. Re-
cently, as public and political opinion has been shifting from
advocating free-market forces to advocating government interven-
tion, institutional activists also have been pursuing director inde-
pendence as an alternative to tender offers and other market
mechanisms that serve as accountability devices.3 4 In addition to
pursuing the goal that boards be composed of a majority of in-
dependent directors, institutional investors have been pressing for
nominating and compensation committees composed of independ-
ent directors, for a chairman of the board who is separate and in-
dependent from the CEO, and for direct communications between
directors and institutional investors.3 5
All of these devices are intended to diminish the power of the
CEO and inside corporate management.3 6 Whether these measures
will strengthen U.S. business and make it more effective and com-
petitive in the global marketplace is another question. As one skep-
tic has stated, the independent outside director conceived by the
ALl "is at best independent of both shareholders and management
and often has no individual economic stake in effectively disciplining
management." 37 On the other hand, reliance on independent direc-
tors probably represents a consensus that major U.S. corporations
are too important to the national economy to be controlled exclu-
sively by either unaccountable, self-appointed managers or amoral
free market forces that elevate efficiency over all humanistic values,
including the very important political value of jobs.
Because corporate governance debates are inherently political, it
can be anticipated that the change in direction the 1992 presidential
election signalled will change academic dialogues about the value
and role of institutional investors. Efficient market theses may no
longer be so fashionable. Articles about ethics and reinterpreta-
tions of fiduciary duty concepts may become more common.38
II. Legislative and Judicial Responses to Institutional Activity
A. The Stakeholder Statutes
The most important check on the power of institutional investors
in the public securities markets has been the stakeholder statutes
34. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (199 1).
35. See Gilbert Fuchsberg, New York City Pension Funds Target Firms for Corporate Gov-
ernance Reform, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1992, at A4; Joann S. Lublin, Other Concerns Are Likely
to Follow GM in Splitting Posts of Chairman and CEO, WALL ST.J., Nov. 4, 1992, at B 1; see also
JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALI=Y OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS
184-85 (1989) (suggesting that "the CEO's power as leader of the board" should be
diminished "by law and by custom").
36. See LORSCH, supra note 35, at 186.
37. Rock, supra note 23, at 449.
38. William W. Bratton,Jr., The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87
Nw. U. L. REv. 180 (1992), may run counter to the anticipated change.
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that well over one-half of the states have passed. Pennsylvania en-
acted the first stakeholder statute in 1986.39 The statute provides
that directors, in considering the best interests of the corporation in
discharging their duties, are permitted to consider the effects of any
action upon all groups affected by such action, including sharehold-
ers, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors of the corporation,
and communities in which offices or other establishments of the cor-
poration are located.40 Furthermore, directors may consider the
short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including
benefits that may accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans
and the possibility that these interests may be best served by the
continued independence of the corporation.
4'
Statutes passed in other states vary, but they all permit directors
to consider corporate constituencies other than investors when as-
certaining the best interests of the corporation.42 States like Cali-
fornia that have not adopted stakeholder statutes adhere to the
traditional principle that a director shall act in good faith in a man-
ner which the director believes to be in the best interests of the cor-
poration and its shareholders. 43
An even more significant change from traditional corporate law
principles is represented by the Connecticut statute that requires di-
rectors to consider the long-term as well as the short-term interests
of the corporation and the shareholders. These interests could be
served best by the continued independence of the corporation and
by consideration of the interests of the corporation's employees,
39. Cf. Arthur R. Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corpo-
rate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV., 473, 480 (1987).
40. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1715-1716 (Supp. 1992).
41. Id. Another Pennsylvania statute contained other strong antitakeover features,
such as a loss of voting rights by acquirers of control blocks and was so controversial
that many Fortune 500 companies were pressured to opt out of the statute. See Justin P.
Klein &Jeffrey P. Greenbaum, Many Pa. Companies Opt Out, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 10, 1990, at
1.
42. At least 28 jurisdictions in addition to Pennsylvania have stakeholder statutes.
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (1990 & Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-313 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 607.0830 (Harrison 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (Michie 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Supp. 1992);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Bums Supp. 1991); IowA CODE § 490.1108 (1991); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210 (Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92 (West 1969
& Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1992); MASS. ANN.
Laws ch. 156B, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138 (Michie Supp.
1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35
(Michie 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (Consol. 1992); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59 (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.2-8
(1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204
(1988); Wis. STAT. § 180.0827 (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-16-830 (1989).
43. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (Deering Supp. 1993).
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customers, creditors, suppliers, community, and societal considera-
tions.44 The Arizona and Idaho statutes require directors to con-
sider the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders, including the possibility that these
interests would be best served by the continued independence of
the corporation. 45 Although the difference between long-term
shareholder interests and non-shareholder interests is unclear,
these statutes would appear to require directors to prefer preserva-
tion of the corporate entity to a premium bid cashing out
shareholders.
Stakeholder statutes were passed as a result of pressure from
managers, employees, and municipalities to counter hostile take-
overs, which these groups perceived to be inimical to the public wel-
fare.46 A few of the statutes therefore are limited to decisionmaking
regarding takeovers, 47 but most of the statutes apply to all contexts
of director decisionmaking. The stakeholder statutes generally were
passed subsequent to the control-share statutes, which require a
shareholder vote or director consent before a change-of-control
transaction can proceed. 48 The stakeholder statutes arguably ad-
dress more general corporate governance concerns than the role of
directors in confronting a hostile takeover.
Academics and private practitioners have criticized the stake-
holder statutes as contrary to the teachings of economic efficiency
and traditional legal standards for directorial behavior.49 In the
light of such criticisms, Delaware has declined to pass a stakeholder
statute.50 The Delaware courts, however, have responded to the
44. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (1990 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602
(Supp. 1992).
46. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes,
87 MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989) (arguing that the purpose of state antitakeover laws "is to
protect nonshareholders from the disruptive impact of... corporate restructuring");
Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
35-43 (1987) (noting that a "shareholders-only view ignores the reality that other con-
stituencies both share the risk and are vital to the success of corporate activity");
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 120-22
(1987) (arguing that "managers are better positioned to secure the enactment of legisla-
tion that shareholders do not desire when management can align themselves with inter-
est groups outside the shareholder-manager nexus").
47. These include the statutes of Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee, cited supra note 42.
48. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b) (Consol. 1992) is typical. A discussion of control-
share statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.
49. ABA Model Act Panel Rejects Other-Constituencies Measures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1217 (Aug. 17, 1990); see also WilliamJ. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?,
59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 424 (1990); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA, Other Constituency
Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253 (1990);JamesJ. Hanks, Jr., Playing with
Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REv. 97, 118 (1991);
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 43-44 (1991).
50. Instead, after considerable controversy, Delaware adopted a control-share stat-
ute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (repl. Vol. 1991 & Supp. 1992); see Lewis S. Black, Jr.,
Why Delaware Is Wary of Anti-Takeover Law, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1987, at 18.
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political pressures that caused other states to pass stakeholder stat-
utes by adjusting the law governing the duty of directors confronted
by hostile takeovers.
B. Judicial Recognition of Non-Shareholder Interests
The business judgment rule shields directors from liability for dis-
interested business decisions made with due care, in good faith, and
without an abuse of discretion. 51 The business judgment rule
grants the same protection to directors in the takeover context as in
any other context. When a board fights a takeover, however, there
is a danger that it is "acting primarily in its own interests, rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders. ' 52 Faced with
this danger, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 53 developed two prerequisites for the application of
the business judgment rule to antitakeover measures. First, the
board must demonstrate good faith and make a reasonable investi-
gation to prove that protection of the corporate enterprise and
shareholders is necessary.5 4 Second, defensive measures must be
reasonable in the face of the threat posed.5 5 This inquiry requires
the board to analyze the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate
enterprise, including a concern for non-shareholder
constituencies. 5
6
In Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,57 the Delaware
Supreme Court articulated a duty for directors to sell the corpora-
tion to the highest bidder when a sale is inevitable.58 Directors have
no general duty to auction off the firm, 59 however, and thus may
work for preservation of the firm and prefer long-term value over
short-term shareholder gain. Directors can therefore look to non-
shareholder, and perhaps even non-economic, interests in consider-
ing whether to capitulate to a hostile takeover.
Chancellor Allen articulated this important principle at length in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.60 Paramount involved an
unsuccessful effort by a tender offeror to upset previously laid
merger plans. In July, 1988, the board of directors of Time Inc.
(Time) authorized its management to negotiate a merger agreement
51. DENNIS BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 12 (3d ed. 1989).
52. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 955.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
58. Id. at 182, 184-85.
59. See Barry Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to Act as an
Auctioneer, 44 Bus. LAW. 275, 278-80 (1989).
60. In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litig. (Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc.), [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch.July 14, 1989).
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with Warner Communications Inc. (Warner).61 From the outset, the
merger was conditioned on a desire to maintain an independent
Time culture, including succession of Time management to senior
positions in the merged entity.62 Of serious importance was the
continued editorial independence of Time magazine.63 On March 3,
1989, the directors of Warner and Time, both Delaware corpora-
tions, agreed to a merger whereby Warner shareholders would own
approximately 62%o of the outstanding shares of the new, combined
entity.64 The new entity would not have been highly leveraged. Be-
cause the merger agreement provided that only Warner shares
would be converted, Delaware law required a vote by only Warner
shareholders. 65 The rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
however, required a vote by Time shareholders as well, 66 so the
merger agreement provided for a vote by the shareholders of both
companies. Time's shareholders were scheduled to vote on June
23, 1989.67
On June 7, 1989, Paramount Communications, Inc. (Paramount)
made a cash tender offer for all outstanding Time common stock at
$175 a share.68 At a June 16, 1989 meeting, Time's board con-
cluded that the Paramount offer was inadequate. 69 The 'board also
concluded that it was not in the long-term interest of Time or its
shareholders to sell the corporation at that time.70 Accordingly,
Time's board restructured the merger as a tender offer by Time for
Warner stock at $70 a share. 71 The tender made shareholder ap-
proval unnecessary and also resulted in a significant leveraging of
Time.72 Paramount, joined by both substantial individual Time
shareholders and a purported shareholder class, sued to enjoin the
Time tender offer for Warner. 73
Chancellor Allen was confronted with two issues: first, whether
Time's directors were under an obligation to seek, in good faith,
only to maximize current share value on June 16;74 and second,
whether the circumstances imposed upon the Time board a fiduci-
ary obligation to afford shareholders a choice with respect to
whether the corporation should be sold or managed for the long
term.75 Both questions were answered in the negative.76 The court
61. Id. at 93,267-73.
62. Id at 93,268-69.
63. Id. at 93,268.
64. Id at 93,270.
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(f) (repl. vol. 1991 & Supp. 1992).
66. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 312.00 (1990).
67. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,271.
68. Id
69. Id at 93,272.
70. Id
71. Id. at 93,274.
72. See Dennis Kneale, Time Warner Offers a Cashless Package of Stock for Remaining
Warner Shares, WALL ST.J., Aug. 24, 1989, at A2.
73. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,265.
74. Id. at 93,278-81.
75. Id at 93,281-82.
76. Id at 93,278-82.
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held that the original merger agreement was not a change-of-con-
trol transaction because the shares of Time and Warner were so
widely held that neither corporation could be said to be acquiring
the other: "Control of both remained in a large, fluid, changeable
and changing market."17 Moreover, Chancellor Allen held that the
Time board was under no duty to let the Time shareholders decide
whether the Paramount offer was better than the Time tender of-
fer.78 Chancellor Allen also concluded that the Time board's re-
structuring was a reasonable response to the threat that its long
term strategic plan would be thwarted.
7 9
The interesting question in Paramount is just what was the long-
term value the directors were allowed to protect against the wishes
of their shareholders. Although Chancellor Allen found that the
Time directors were concerned "for the larger role of the enterprise
in society," he decided that there was an "insufficient basis to sup-
pose.., that such concerns have caused the directors to sacrifice or
ignore their duty to seek to maximize in the long run financial re-
turns to the corporation and its stockholders."8 30 Yet the Chancellor
acknowledged that in an efficient, well-developed stock market there
should be "no discount for long-term profit maximizing behavior
except that reflected in the discount for the time value of money.28 1
Further, he recognized that the concept of long-term management
includes charitable giving and similar endeavors.8 2
Before the court decided Paramount, courts had upheld the validity
of defensive recapitalizations in prior cases.83 Further, the Delaware
Court of Chancery also had articulated the principle that directors
need not pursue immediate maximization of share value at the ex-
pense of long-term strategic plans.8 4 Indeed, in a prior case Chan-
cellor Allen refused to compel a board of directors to redeem a
shareholder rights or poison pill plan in the face of a tender offer
77. Id. at 93,280. The court recognized that Time shareholders would have suffered
dilution. This dilution is the basis of the NYSE rule requiring a shareholder vote in such
situations. See supra note 66. The significance of this ruling to the case is that if there is
no sale of control, there is no Revlon duty to maximize a sale price. See supra notes 57-59
and accompanying text.
78. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,282-83.
79. Id- at 93,283-84.
80. Id. at 93,269.
81. Id. at 93,277. In his view, directors may reject efficient market theory and "oper-
ate on the theory that stock market valuation is 'wrong.'" Id.
82. Id. at 93,277 n.15.
83. E.g., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding
that good faith use of recapitalization by directors should defeat motion for injunction
by entity seeking to acquire corporation), aft'd, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); GAF Corp. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
84. See TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (denying an injunction sought by an ac-
quiring corporation against directors of the target corporation to require redemption of
previously granted stock rights).
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conditioned on such redemption. In so doing, the Chancellor rec-
ognized that the proposition that directors owe a duty "to the cor-
poration and its shareholders" 8 5 masks the fundamental issue:
whether the board represents long-term shareholder interests, cor-
porate entity interests, or multi-constituency interests, or whether it
represents short-term shareholder interests or current share value
interests. Further, permitting directors to consider long-term inter-
ests allows them to support "research and product development;
personnel training and compensation; and charitable and commu-
nity financial support."'8 6 Nevertheless, Chancellor Allen's decision
in Paramount went somewhat further than prior cases in permitting
directors to consider constituencies other than current
shareholders.8
7
Although the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Chancellor Al-
len's decision, it did so on narrower grounds, holding that Time was
not for sale within the meaning of the Revlon case and that therefore
the two-pronged Unocal test applied to the Time-Warner merger.88
Nevertheless, in applying that test and holding that the directors of
Time were entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule,
the court noted that in evaluating the threat posed by a takeover
bid, one appropriate consideration is "the impact on 'constituen-
cies' other than shareholders. "9
III. Stakeholders in the Principles
There are three sections of the Principles in which the drafters im-
plicate the stakeholder concept and mention it in the commentary.
These are section 2.01, discussing the objectives and conduct of the
corporation; section 4.01, discussing the business judgment rule;
and section 6.02, discussing the actions of directors in blocking an
unsolicited tender offer.90 All of these provisions generally relegate
directors' concern for the interests of non-shareholder constituen-
cies to the realm of ethics and take the view that the economic inter-
ests of shareholders are superior to the interests of all other
constituencies. 91 The stakeholder statutes are rationalized away as
consistent with case law and standing for the proposition that con-
cern by directors for non-shareholder constituencies is in the long-
term interests of shareholders. 92
85. Id. at 92,178.
86. Id. at 92,178 n.6.
87. "The mission of the firm is not seen by those involved with it as wholly eco-
nomic, nor the continued existence of its distinctive identity as a matter of indifference."
In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litig. (Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.),
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
88. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. Shareholder Li-
tig.), 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1990).
89. Id. at 1153.
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According to section 2.01 of the Principles, the objective of a cor-
poration is "the conduct of business activities with a view to enhanc-
ing corporate profit and shareholder gain." 93 There are only
limited exceptions to this general rule. A corporation "[m]ay take
into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business." 94 In addition,
a corporation may devote "reasonable . . . resources" to philan-
thropy.95 This black letter law states the rule of some venerable
cases. 96 The stakeholder statutes are not specifically mentioned
anywhere in the commentary to this section.9 7 Indeed, in discussing
implementation of the section, the Principles expresses a preference
for case law, rather than statutory development.98
Concepts set forth in the stakeholder statutes, however, are dis-
cussed in the comments. In describing the economic objective of
the corporation, the comments state that:
The modem corporation by its nature creates interdependencies
with a variety of groups with whom the corporation has a legiti-
mate concern, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and mem-
bers of the communities in which the corporation operates. The
long-term profitability of the corporation generally depends on
meeting the fair expectations of such groups. Short-term profits
may properly be subordinated to recognition that responsible
maintenance of these interdependencies is likely to contribute to
long-term profitability and shareholder gain. The corporation's
business may be conducted accordingly.99
Later in the commentary, concerns for employees, customers, sup-
pliers, and communities are relegated to ethical considerations or to
public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic pur-
poses.' 0 0 The Principles does not admit the possibility that directors
might be legally required to consider such constituencies and to bal-
ance those interests against shareholder interests.' 0 ' Furthermore,
the Principles does not mention considering the interests of
creditors.' 0
2
As Professor Lawrence Mitchell has argued persuasively, the cases
93. Id. § 2.01(a).
94. Id. § 2.01(b)(2).
95. Id. § 2.01(b) (3).
96. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); A.P. Smith Mfg. v.
Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
97. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2.01 cmts. a-i, at 69-89.
98. Id. § 2.01 cmt. b, at 70.
99. Id. § 2.01 cmt. f, at 72-76, 72-73.
100. Id. § 2.01 cmts. h-i, at 80-89.
101. See id. § 2.01 cmts. a-i, at 69-89.
102. See id.
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obliging directors to consider the interests of shareholders devel-
oped in situations where director self-interest conflicted with share-
holder interests.' 03 In some situations, the Supreme Court has
imposed a fiduciary duty to another constituency-creditors-for
the purpose of limiting director self-interest.' 4 In recent years,
bondholders have tried to impose a duty on directors to consider
their interests in tender offers and restructurings.10 5 These efforts
thus far have failed in the courts, 10 6 but some of the stakeholder
statutes permit or require directors to consider creditor interests. 10
7
In articulating the duty of care imposed upon directors, the Princi-
ples generally exhorts directors to consider "the best interests of the
corporation,"' 0 8 and refers back to section 2.01.109 In discussing
the duty of directors in tender offers, however, the Principles refers
indirectly to the stakeholder statutes. 10 Under section 6.02, direc-
tors generally may act to block a takeover only if their actions are "a
reasonable response to the offer.""' In determining whether ac-
tion is reasonable, directors may consider threats to the corpora-
tion's "essential economic prospects." 112 The board may have
regard for the interests of non-shareholder groups "with respect to
which the corporation has a legitimate concern if to do so would not
significantly disfavor the long-term interests of shareholders." ' " 3
Although the stakeholder statutes are mentioned in the commen-
tary, they are not given their due either in the black letter law
quoted above, or in the comments. 14 Rather, the commentary
states that the statutes "can be construed in a manner consistent
103. Mitchell, supra note 7, at 585.
104. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-10 (1939) (disallowing a secured claim of
a controlling shareholder in a bankruptcy proceeding).
105. See Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm.,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 26-32 (1989) (testimony ofJohnJ. Creedon,Jr.); William W. Brat-
ton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DuKE Lj.
92; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13J. CORP. L. 205 (1988); Lawrence
E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1990).
106. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,744 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1989); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons v. Cogan, 542
A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (noting that "the rights of the noteholders were fixed by agree-
ment" and that nothing short of a breach of those terms would be actionable).
107. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
202(b)(5) (Michie 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b)(1) (Supp. 1992); IOwA CODE
§ 490.1108(1)(a) (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4)(a) (Baldwin 1992); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G)(2) (West Supp. 1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65
(Law. Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d)(1) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(3)(a) (Michie
Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D)(1) (Michie 1992); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(E)(1) (Anderson 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.2-8(a)(1) (1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 47-33-4(1)(b) (1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-16-830(e)(i) (1989).
108. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 4.01(a).
109. Id. § 4.01 cmt. d, at 184-86.
110. Id. § 6.02(a).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 6.02(b)(1).
113. Id. § 6.02(b)(2).
114. See id. § 6.02 cmts. a-f, at 548-77.
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with §§ 2.01 and 6.02.""5 Although this construction may be cor-
rect, the statutes also could be construed much more liberally to
prefer non-shareholder interests to shareholder interests in appro-
priate circumstances. The long-term interests of shareholders are
not necessarily the same as the short-term or long-term interests of
creditors or employees.
IV Rights and Duties Under the Stakeholder Model
A. Contributions to Capital
The stakeholder model is premised on the theory that groups in
addition to shareholders have claims on a corporation's assets and
earnings because those groups contribute to a corporation's capital.
Like shareholders, bondholders provide corporations with capital
and expect to be dealt with fairly and to receive a return on that
capital. Bondholders receive their return in the form of interest and
a redemption or sale of their bonds, and shareholders receive their
return in the form of dividends and a liquidation of their investment
by the sale of their stock. Accordingly, price fluctuations in the trad-
ing markets materially affect bondholders as well as stockholders.
Further, because of the blurring of debt and equity in the many new
financial products designed to accommodate institutional investors
and the trading patterns of institutions, the distinctions between
debt and equity from a financial perspective are no longer as mean-
ingful as they used to be."16 Legal theory has lagged behind the
developments in the marketplace, where equity capital is provided
to corporations for a period of time that may well be shorter than an
investment in the form of debt. 1 7 Holders of junk bonds may re-
semble old-fashioned equity investors more than holders of non-
voting common stock with a guaranteed dividend rate higher than
that of other stockholders. ' 8
Employees have a different claim on a corporation's assets than
investors. Their financial contribution to the corporation is in the
form of human capital. Although Anglo-American legal traditions
have treated the relationship between labor and management as an
115. Id § 6.02 cmt. a, at 548-55. As one commentator responded, "[I]f the statutes
do nothing more than codify current law, with no changes at all, why did the legislatures
of well over half the states bother adopting them?" Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 971.
116. See High-Fashion Hybrids, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 1992, at 75 (discussing the emer-
gence of preference equity redemption cumulative stock).
117. See Ferrara & Zirlin, supra note 3, at 351, 353-57.
118. See BLOCH, supra note 24, at 95-104; see also Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Con-
flict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1, 32-37 (1992) (noting that "the groups that
emerge as dominant determine the institution's behavior" and that "[t]he dominance of
a group depends not on its stake or the nature of the group's interest in the firm, but
rather on the firm's perceived dependence on the group and the resources it provides").
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adversarial encounter, in which bargaining and contract are the reg-
ulating mechanisms, there is a growing unease about this model. A
dismantling of hierarchical management structures, made possible
by computerization and made necessary by global competition, has
led to greater employee participation in decisionmaking and more
cooperative relations between labor and management.' 19 Corpora-
tions now emphasize quality rather than standardization in manufac-
turing. 120 Also, service jobs are replacing many manufacturing
jobs.12 Governance structures such as the German two-tier board
model, in which labor is represented on the board of directors, have
been suggested by some as a means for improving the effectiveness
of American business and as possibly more appropriate to modern
business organizations.'
22
Communities contribute to a corporation's capital more indi-
rectly. The community in which a plant or office is located provides
governmental services to the business and its employees. It may, in
addition, provide tax incentives to that business. Finally, stake-
holder statutes frequently recognize customers or suppliers as cor-
porate constituents, but it is difficult to weave any theory as to how
they supply a corporation with capital unless they are providers of
trade credit. Generally, customers, suppliers, and a business corpo-
ration are mutually dependent upon one another for profit.
When the capital contributions of different corporate constituen-
cies are examined in the context of the stakeholder statutes, it can
be argued that shareholders are not entitled to a control premium
that is excessive when analyzed from the perspective of creditors,
employees, or others.' 23 Although case law has established that
shareholders may be paid a control premium, 124 the stakeholder
statutes could be utilized to limit that premium to an amount that
does not damage other constituencies. 125 In the Paramount case,
Chancellor Allen held that the Time board could follow a long-term
strategy that, in effect, deprived public shareholders of their control
premium. 1 26 In some situations, bondholders have complained that
the size of a takeover premium reflected a portion of their capital.
127
Similarly, if a takeover leads to plant closings and layoffs, employees
could complain that they have been deprived of their human capital
contributions to a corporation. Further, if a state or municipality
119. See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW REALITIES 207-20 (1989); ROBERT B. REICH,
TALES OF A NEW AMERICA 118-26 (1987).
120. REICH, supra note 119, at 123-26.
121. Id. at 120-23.
122. See Buxbaum, supra note 32, at 29-45.
123. In most takeovers, the bidder offers a premium over the market price that repre-
sents all or part of a control premium.
124. E.g., Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (4th Cir. 1978); McDaniel v.
Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1969); Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d
387, 388 (N.Y. 1979).
125. Cf Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.) (holding that majority stock-
holder may have to account to minority holder for gains), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 60-82.
127. See McDaniel, supra note 105, at 206-09.
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afforded the corporation tax breaks, the community could complain
that it has been deprived of the long-term value of such tax incen-
tives. The stakeholder statutes appear to be an effort to prevent
such damage in the future.
B. Director Duties
If boards of directors are permitted or required to take different
constituencies into account, they need to develop standards for bal-
ancing these interests. The only situation in which directors, under
current case law, are required to balance shareholder and creditor
interests is as a corporation approaches insolvency. In this situa-
tion, creditors have preference over shareholders. 128 If such balanc-
ing becomes the norm in other situations, the law needs to develop
mechanisms for continuing to hold directors accountable for due
care and fair dealing. One appeal of the traditional view, that direc-
tors work for the economic benefit of shareholders, is that this is a
simple standard that has been made legally enforceable through de-
rivative and shareholder class actions. In theory, bondholders could
be given the right to bring derivative actions, especially in cases in-
volving self-dealing or abuse of corporate privileges.1 29 When di-
rectors are negligent or engage in self-dealing, there is no intuitive
reason why only shareholders should be entitled to hold directors to
account, because these transgressions also harm other corporate
stakeholders.
If, however, shareholders, creditors, employees, and others were
all given legal remedies to enforce director duties owed to them, the
courts rather than directors would be forced to decide the relative
merits of the claims of competing constituencies. A litigation explo-
sion could follow, with no assurance of greater director accountabil-
ity or effectiveness or profit to the business corporation. It does not
appear that the legislatures that passed the stakeholder statutes in-
tended to impose new duties on directors that creditors, employees,
and other constituencies could legally enforce directly.130 Rather,
the import of these laws was to establish that directors should work
for the survival of the corporation and the continuation of its busi-
ness for the benefit of its various constituencies. In practical terms,
this interpretation means not only fending off an unwelcome or dis-
reputable bidder who threatens to undermine the capital base or
liquidate the corporation, but also preserving a sound corporate
128. See In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928
(1983); Bank Leumi-Le-Israel v. Sunbelt Indus., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D. Ga.
1980).
129. See Mitchell, supra note 105, at 1189-212.
130. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 1992).
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capital structure that is fair to all constituencies.13 1
C. Shareholder Duties
A very interesting question is whether, under the stakeholder
model, duties to other constituencies can be imposed upon major
shareholders. Under traditional legal standards, only controlling
shareholders are viewed as fiduciaries, and the duties imposed upon
them run to minority shareholders, not to creditors, employees, or
others. In a few cases where shareholders have negligently permit-
ted a corporation to be looted, courts have held them liable for the
benefit of non-shareholder constituencies. 132 In the closed corpora-
tion context, courts have been enlarging the concept of fiduciary
duty owed by shareholders by analogizing to partnership law.' 33
Although partners owe a duty of loyalty to one another, they gener-
ally do not owe duties to creditors or employees. Because they are
personally liable to creditors, however, they may have a heightened
sense of responsibility concerning debts incurred by the partner-
ship. Consideration of whether shareholders owning far less than
the traditional twenty-five percent thought necessary to exercise
control should shoulder fiduciary duties seems appropriate in an in-
stitutional marketplace.' 3 4 The stakeholder statutes implicitly raise
the question of whether some shareholders should bear responsibil-
ities to non-shareholder constituencies, but the imposition of such
duties could radically change the principle of limited shareholder
liability. This liability could arise because shareholders who im-
properly usurp the control premium would become liable to credi-
tors and possibly even employees, in the type of situations where
they are now liable, if at all, only to minority shareholders. 13
Any such responsibilities to one another imposed on stakeholders
should be limited to maintaining the viability of the corporation's
capitalization. In some bankruptcy proceedings of corporations
which became insolvent as the result ofjunk bond recapitalizations,
actions against shareholders have been brought on a theory that
shareholders should be liable to creditors if distributions to them
caused the corporation's insolvency.' 3 6 Cases against shareholders
131. State Blue Sky statutes that have a fair, just, and equitable standard require that
a capitalization be fair to public stockholders when a corporation becomes a public com-
pany. There is no comparable merit standard under the federal securities laws. SeeJo-
SEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAw § 1.03 (1992).
132. See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (NJ. 1981).
133. Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (Mass. 1988); Smith v. Atlantic
Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 1981); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New
England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).
134. The author made this argument in Roberta S. Karmel, Greenmail, the Control Pre-
mium and Shareholder Duty, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937 (1991).
135. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F,2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969).
136. See RobertJ. White, LBOs and Fraudulent Conveyances, 22 REv. SEC. & COMMODI-
sS REG. 133 (1990); Amy D. Marcus, Revco ExaminerAppears to Find Some Basis for Suits by
Creditors, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1990, at B6. These cases have been based on bankruptcy
law principles, which treat these conveyances as fraudulent conveyances.
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for liability to creditors, when the shareholders looted a corporation
in connection with a sale of control, however, have on occasion been
successful. 137 It seems anomalous that shareholders should be able
to deplete corporate assets to the detriment of other constituen-
cies-especially creditors-with impunity.
The central issue in this debate is the soundness of a corpora-
tion's capitalization for the benefit of all of its constituencies. If dis-
tributions to shareholders are so excessive that they impair a
corporation financially, bondholders and employees ought to have
some mechanism for preventing such distributions. 3 8 On the other
hand, if employee compensation is so excessive as to diminish the
capital available for dividends, shareholders and bondholders ought
to have some recourse, not only against directors, but against a cor-
poration's employees. ' 3 9 The essential problem is appropriately ad-
justing the claims of these diverse corporate constituencies so that
the corporation remains a solvent and ongoing business enterprise.
The stakeholder statutes were based on a recognition that some
leveraged takeovers and recapitalizations were killing the corporate
goose whose golden eggs had been feeding not only shareholders,
but also creditors, employees, and others. Future interpretations of
these statutes should motivate directors to prevent any single con-
stituency from usurping a corporation's capitalization for its own
use in such a manner that other valid constituencies are significantly
harmed. Further, mechanisms should be developed to enable lend-
ers and employees as well as shareholders to monitor directorial ac-
tivity to insure that the business enterprise remains viable.
Ironically, it is institutional investors who are in the best position to
develop such mechanisms and use their power to make corporations
more effective and viable in the long term, because they own debt as
well as equity and also represent employee interests. Thus, these
institutions may act to protect the interests of diverse stakeholders
in the corporation.
Conclusion
The Principles treats the enactment of stakeholder statutes as a
nonevent. Stakeholder statutes are, however, part of a powerful
137. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971);
Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971).
138. At one time, regulation of dividend payments protected creditors from excessive
distributions to shareholders that would impair a corporation's capital. See MODEL Busi-
NESS CORP. AcT § 6.40 (1979). The protection that such statutes provide to bondhold-
ers of public companies is problematic because restraints against paying excessive
dividends come into play only when a corporation is on the verge of insolvency.
139. This theory is the essence of an action for waste. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582
(1933).
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political revulsion against hostile takeovers and leveraged recapitali-
zations. These statutes favor director control and discretion over
shareholder prerogatives. Stakeholder statutes present a new cor-
porate governance model that needs to be taken seriously in order
for directors to be held accountable for the success or failure of
business enterprises. In addition, these statutes suggest that the
rights of shareholders will be limited by the claims of non-share-
holder constituencies. Directors of corporations of the future will
be challenged to balance and mediate the claims of many constitu-
encies for the benefit of all concerned. After directors decide how
to balance the varied interests, courts will undoubtedly look to the
stakeholder statutes for guidance in assessing the business judg-
ments the directors have made.
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